Corpus Christi, Corpus Dei

St. John Henry Newman says that to be deep in history is to cease to be Protestant. This is true regarding our doctrines on the true presence of the Eucharist. The Council of Ephesus anticipates the teachings of transubstantiation at Lateran IV and Trent. St. Cyril of Alexandria’s communication of idioms demonstrates the unity of the two natures in the esse personale (personal essence) of the Son. In light of Ephesus, later Eucharistic theologies that separate the natures of Christ become untenable. As early as Ephesus, Christian theology is metaphysically committed to real presence and transubstantiation. If one rejects the doctrines of Lateran IV and Trent, they also depart from the doctrines of Ephesus.

So let’s do three things. First, let’s remember the basic historical ground regarding the Council of Ephesus and Cyril of Alexandria. Second, let’s review the communication of idioms and the unity of the natures in the Person of Christ with St. Cyril (and Aquinas, who is especially Cyrilline at the beginning of the Tertia Pars speaking on the unity of Christ).¹ Third, let’s realize that a coherent acceptance of the Council of Ephesus already commits one to believing in the real Presence in the Eucharist.

Constantinople I and Ephesus

The third Ecumenical Council, Ephesus in 431, finished what was started at Constantinople I.

Constantinople I in 381 responded to Apollinaris. Apollinaris thought that if Christ was truly divine, he had to have a divine mind and will, so a human mind and will would be redundant or superfluous. We can look at the short form of his thought:

1. Christ is divine (Nicaea), which means He has a divine mind and will.
2. But having both a human mind and will and a divine mind and will would be either redundant/superfluous or dividing, making him two subjects.
3. Therefore, the divine mind and will replace the human mind and will.

The Cappadocians — Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory Nazianzus, and Basil of Caesarea — had a big economic problem with this. The Cappadocians mint the traditional axiom that what is not assumed is not saved. In order for Christ’s life, death, and resurrection to work, He has to be like us in all things but sin, full stop. From the later Chalcedonian definition, “truly man . . . the same of a rational soul and body . . . consubstantial with us.” So the Cappadocians understood that Christ has to be like us in all things, because what is not assumed is not saved, but a metaphysics of the unity of the natures in the person of Christ was yet to be fully articulated at the end of Constantinople I.

Then Ephesus responds to Nestorius, who argues that the Divine Son takes a man, Jesus of Nazareth, to Himself. We can look at the short form of Nestorius’ thought:

1. Christ is truly God (Nicaea).
2. Christ is truly man (Constantinople I).
3. Therefore, Christ has two agencies/is two subjects (the Divine Person comes to dwell in a human person).

Cyril of Alexandria, on the other hand, applies Nicaea and Constantinople like this:

1. Christ is truly God (Nicaea).
2. Christ is truly man (Constantinople I).
3. Christ is one divine Person who assumes a human nature.

How does Cyril arrive at the unity in the Person of Christ? He follows the logic of Scripture. Scripture predicates divine things of the man Jesus of Nazareth and human things of God. For example, John 1: “God dwelt among us.” For example, Colossians 1: “The world was made in, through, and for [Jesus].” Because the grammar of Scripture ascribes human things of God and divine things of Jesus, Cyril understood that there must be a single unifying subject of the ascriptions. The single unifying subject is the Person of the Word.

The beginning of the first letter of John gives us a very tangible, tactile example of the communication of idioms. They heard, saw with their eyes, and touched with their hands God Himself, who was from eternity:

What was from the beginning,

What we have heard,

what we have seen with our eyes,

what we looked upon

and touched with our hands…

we have seen it and testify to it (1 John 1:1–2).

The communication of idioms means that we can predicate divine things of the man Jesus of Nazareth (Col. 1) and human things of God (John 1) precisely because of the unity of Person/subject/hypostasis in Christ. This does not mean, however, that we can predicate human things of the divine nature or divine things of the human nature. It must be the Person that we are predicating things of. For example, we can truly say that God was born (Theotokos). God suffered. God died. Jesus Christ is the alpha and omega and will make all things new (but the human nature is not eternal, and the divine nature does not die).

Communication of Idioms and the Eucharist

²

How do Cyril, and Aquinas following him, figure out that the unity is in the Person, and how is this possible? Nestorius didn’t see it, and even Aristotle might not have seen it according to his analysis of a person. For Aristotle, an analysis of a person yields two principal substantial parts of the substance: body and substantial form (soul), related as potency to act.³

But Cyril’s analysis of a person, and Aquinas following him, yields a third principle — esse — existence. Aquinas borrows Boethius’ definition of a person — an individual substance of a rational nature. But Aquinas actually subtly tweaks the definition. For Aquinas, a person is not just an individual substance of a rational nature, but an individual subsistence of a rational nature. That is, something that subsists, something that exists.⁴

We exist, and Christ exists. So Christ has everything that we have — body, soul, and esse (existence). But Christ does not exist how we exist. We exist as created acts of existence. Christ exists as an uncreated act of existence, an eternally subsistent relation. But Christ also has everything we do. He is like us in all things but sin. He has a body, soul, and an esse. Every human person, including Jesus of Nazareth, has a body + soul + esse. However, Christ has an uncreated esse, an uncreated eternally subsistent relation, whereas we just have created existence.

For Nestorius, there is no distinction between person and nature. The divine person has a divine nature, and the human person has a human nature. But for Cyril, because of the possibility of the human nature subsisting according to the divine nature, or the divine Person assuming a human nature, there is the possibility of the distinction between person and nature.

Interestingly, this means that our understanding of the real distinction between person and nature depends upon the real distinction between creature and Creator. It is only by an uncreated act of existence that it is possible for one Person to assume another nature. The real distinction between person and nature depends upon the real distinction between creature and creator.

This distinction between person and nature maintains the coherence not only of Ephesus and Chalcedon but also of the later Councils that directly treat sacramental and Eucharistic theology, too.

The communication of idioms and the distinction between person and nature are permanently relevant. Without it, how do we understand something like John 1, that God dwelt among us? Or 1 John 1:1, that they touched and saw God? How do we understand the Eucharist? The Eucharist is the body of God, which exists only according to the esse personale of the Son, He Who is before all ages. It is the same Person in the Tabernacle now who exists from eternity.

The communication of idioms is so important for Eucharistic theology because the Body of Christ cannot subsist apart from His Divinity, since His Divine Nature stands in for its act of existence. On one hand, His Body cannot exist anywhere without His Divinity. His Body depends upon the eternal Person of the Son for its very existence, subsisting according to the esse personale of the Son, the uncreated eternally subsisting relation. On the other hand, His Divinity cannot subsist in another substance besides His humanity; this would constitute a new Incarnation. This means that there is no tenable Eucharistic theology which holds that Christ is only spiritually present in bread but not bodily present, if one is to maintain Ephesus. To follow the third Ecumenical Council, one must hold that if Christ is really present according to a created substance, it can only be in His humanity. In a word, for Ephesus the unity of Christ necessarily implies transubstantiation. Trent⁵ and Lateran IV⁶ are not confused late Councils; the Eucharistic theology of Trent and Lateran IV are already anticipated by Ephesus.

As Teresa of Ávila reminded her sisters, we can never move on from or set aside the humanity of Christ. The path to Eucharistic understanding and devotion is the same old road since the New Testament and its articulated understanding at Ephesus and everything that Ephesus implies, which is that God suffered and died for us. God gives us his human body. God shares his own human graces with us. God’s body is in every tabernacle — the same God who exists from eternity and who John and the other apostles heard and saw and touched.