God Is Not Ineffective Against Evil

The problem of evil is a profound enigma. Even for people who believe in God, the presence of evil can be overwhelming. Many ask, “How could God be so silent or inactive?” A look at history reveals countless evils, including wars and genocides. But evil is not restricted to history. Indeed, the daily news contains stories of rapes, murders, natural disasters, and children with incurable illnesses among several other human tragedies. However, the most troubling part is that our own lives are not immune to evil. They suffer evils from unemployment to the death of loved ones.

As everyone experiences evil, it seems only reasonable to question God’s abilities or willingness to combat evil, if not God altogether. The Catechism of the Catholic Church states that evil is a “scandal,”1 and points outs that to the problem of evil “no quick answer will suffice.”2 Hence, it is no wonder that atheists have exploited the “scandalous” nature of evil to deny God.

The Scottish enlightenment philosopher David Hume — attributing Epicurus — wrote, “Is he [God] willing to prevent evil, but not able? then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?”3 St. Thomas Aquinas stated the dilemma more sharply. “[I]f one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the word ‘God’ means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world.”4

Theists have responded to such arguments; however, two extremes ought to be avoided. The theists must, on the one hand, avoid reducing evil to just some mystery of God. Saying that God works in mysterious ways, or that some mysteries are better left alone, is to not answer at all. Notwithstanding its mystery, people tormented by the pains of evil deserve real explanations. On the other hand, making it seem that the problem of evil is not so difficult to explain should also be avoided. Merely asserting that God brings good from evil, or that evil is the product of free will, is tantamount to suggesting that the mystery of evil has been solved. Certainly, free will and God’s ability to bring good from evil can explain aspects of the problem of evil; yet, when answered in an overconfident manner, such answers are often unsatisfying.

Catholic apologist Jimmy Akin proposes a better approach to answering the problem of evil. He notes, “It is a mystery why God allows us to suffer, but there are reasons for our suffering that can help us endure it.”5 This is the approach taken in this article.

The article explores the apparent ineffectiveness of God to eliminate or counter evil. In so doing, it does not claim to have resolved the problem of evil, but hopefully provides a sufficient reason to help people endure its painful effects. Also, it does not attempt to prove God’s existence but rather that evil and the Christian concept of God are not mutually exclusive; that is, that evil does not contradict God’s existence. The article proceeds in four parts. The first two segments deal with the logical problem of evil, centering on the question of whether effectivity is an attribute of an all-powerful God. The last two segments discuss the evidential problem of evil by seeing if we have the maturity to access God’s reasoning. It concludes by proposing that the only complete answer to the problem of evil is the fullness of the Christian faith.

God and Evil

In the Proslogion, St. Anselm describes the God of Christianity as “that than which nothing greater can be thought.”6 At first, this seems simple enough: God is the highest conceivable thing. But what does this truly mean?

Ordinary, something can be made greater by adding to it, e.g. multiplying a recipe’s ingredient quantities can produce a feast. However, God is not affected by arithmetics. If God were, then God plus something else (e.g. an atom) would be greater than God by Himself. Thus, God would cease to be that “than which nothing greater can be thought” as something greater than God was conceived (i.e. God plus an atom).

Yet the Anselmian God plus anything else, no matter how great, will always, paradoxically, be greater than any such addition.7 Indeed, the Christian concept of God, as “that than which nothing greater can be thought,” signifies that God must consequentially and logically be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. These are the three classical attributes of God, such that God would not be God without them.

These attributes are based on the Anselmian conception of God as the being of greatest possible or maximal perfection; hence God exemplifies the maximally perfect set of great-making properties. A great-making property is a property that is intrinsically better to have than not have. Existence is a great-making property, as to have existence is intrinsically better than to lack existence. Similarly, omnipotence and omniscience are intrinsically better to have than to lack. Nonetheless, God is simple, as all such properties are unified under the single notion of maximal perfection.8

Indeed, God as omnipotent and omniscient has been the standard, practically undisputed theistic position. For instance, the proposition that God is omnipotent has been expressed as a de dicto necessary truth as this is a required attribute of God. Pushing it further, many theists that sustain the Anselmian conception of God hold that omnipotence is also a de re necessity, for such an attribute is constitutive of God ontologically, both for the kind-essence of deity and the individual-essence for any being who is God.9 Moreover, the position that God is necessarily omnipotent articulates de dicto an essential requisite for God, as God, to be truly God, must possess maximal power. A parallel case can be made for omniscience.10

Similarly, God’s omnibenevolence, as understood in Judeo-Christian tradition, is a relatively undisputed claim. The position that God is good has been expressed by theists as both a de dicto and de re necessity; de dicto as goodness is a required condition for having the ontological status of being God or for holding the divine office, and de re as goodness is considered to be an essential attribute of any being who truly is God. Moreover, theists have also held that God is necessarily good as a de dicto requirement, for God cannot be merely good but needs to be good essentially.11

So having described the Christian God, it is time to move on to the Christian view of evil as a privation. Evil, as such, is not a thing; indeed, evil lacks substance of its own. Nor is evil a being, for all beings are either God (the Creator) or creatures created by God. Furthermore, if evil were a thing, God as Creator ex nihilo of everything that exists would be to blame for evil’s existence.12

Evil as a privation was St. Aquinas’ position. Citing St. Augustine’s The City of God, he states that evil “indicates a lack of good.”13 He articulates two ways that evil can be understood. Firstly, “as that which is the subject of evil, and this is something.”14 That is to say as an accident, as a verb rather than a noun. Secondly, as “evil itself; and this is not any thing, but is the very privation of some particular good.”15

St. Aquinas notes that good can be defined as “that which all desire” and therefore, as evil opposes good, “evil is opposed to the desirable.”16 He argues “that which is opposed to the desirable as such cannot be anything” because it would contradict its own existence, as existence is a good, but evil — being opposed to good — would oppose existence, and “what is opposed to existence cannot be something.”17 However, this does not mean that evil is not real. Evil is not an illusion, as Christian Science and other cults erroneously teach.18 It may be compared to a hole, which can be described as an absence of ground; it is not a thing, as it lacks substance, but it is still very real, and painfully so should you fall into it.

Evil as a privation does not let God off the hook. Could not God do something? Could God not intervene to prevent the privation from occurring, or at least not letting it cause suffering? The atheist could propose that God, like a man which notices a baby crawl onto a busy street and does nothing despite having no risk to self but watches the baby die, is scum.19 Moreover, (on the premise that the three classical attributes of God are accepted as true and necessary) a God that could stop evil but does not is ineffective. He would not be doing His job.

Is effectivity a requirement for God?

The above complaint of God’s (apparent) ineffectiveness suggests that effectivity is a requirement for God to be truly God. Indeed, effectiveness seems to be a great-making property, for it certainly appears better to have effectivity than to lack it.20 Ergo, if God were ineffective, the concept of God would be rendered incoherent and this would be proof of His non-existence.

Nevertheless, the theist may counter this by proving that, actually, effectivity is not a great-making property; that it is not intrinsically better to have than to lack, and hence not a requirement for God. It could be noted that effectiveness — i.e. how successful an individual is in accomplishing desired tasks — is certainly a good property to have, should one be limited in energy, recourses, and/or time. Hence, a person is effective when able to make good use of the limited resources and time available, while likewise making good use of his/her limited personal energy, to successfully accomplish the desired tasks.

God, however, is not subject to such limitations. Being omnipotent and eternal, God cannot experience limitations concerning either power, resources, nor time. Unless the being is limited — which is not the case with God — there is no good reason for effectivity to be a property which is intrinsically better to have than to lack. Hence, for the Christian/Anselmian God, there is no good reason for Him to have effectivity as a property which He is required to exemplify.21 Therefore, the argument of accusing God of being ineffective does not succeed.

This in turn would mean that God and the existence of evil are not mutually exclusive, for, without such limitations, God can deal with evil in His own “time” and way. Since He is unfettered by time and space, Christians acknowledge Him as the “God who . . . can do this and wills to do it, the God who will put his almighty power to work for this plan.”22

The above section is a possible solution to the logical problem of evil, yet it still leaves us with the evidential problem of evil; particularly that evil seems to be senseless. Indeed, atheists advance that even if God is logically possible, He is extremely improbable in the face of tremendous, seemingly senseless suffering.23

God’s will and ways

Another thing the theist could point out is that to suggest that God is ineffective would require us humans (particularly the atheist making such an accusation) to understand God’s aims and objectives; i.e. His will. For certainly, the most convincing way to accuse a person of being ineffective is by knowing what that person intends or is required to do but for some reason, other than a force majeure, is not successfully achieving.24 Hence, the atheist making such an accusation would have the burden of proof to demonstrate that we humans understand God’s will and way. Put simply, the atheist claims comprehending God — and this is a big claim.

Some theists have fallen into this trap also by suggesting that evil leads to a greater good which can be readily observed. Likewise, this would require such theists to possess knowledge of God’s inner workings. Indeed, God does permit — not cause — evil and suffering for the greater good;25 however, this greater good might be eons in the future, and hence not readily observable.

Moreover, atheist William L. Rowe proposed that some senseless evils do not lead to a greater good. Rowe tells a story of a fawn that suffers a long, horrible and agonizing death caused by a forest fire and then asks, “Could an omnipotent, omniscient being have prevented the fawn’s apparently pointless suffering?”26 He answers yes and continues by arguing that, because there seem to exist senseless evils which are preventable, “there do exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.”27 But because God does not prevent such instances of evil, God must not exist — or so Rowe infers.

However, Rowe also recognizes that “we are often surprised by how things we thought to be unconnected turn out to be intimately connected.”28 Hence opening the possibility that perhaps “even though we cannot see how the fawn’s suffering is required to obtain some greater good (or to prevent some equally bad or worse evil), it hardly follows that it is not so required.” So “perhaps, for all we know, there is some familiar good outweighing the fawn’s suffering to which that suffering is connected in a way we do not see.”29

The skeptical theist Stephen J. Wykstra notes that the “crux of his [Rowe’s] argument is that much suffering ‘does not appear to serve any outweighing good.’”30 Wykstra, in response, developed CORNEA, which is recognized as a “formidable objection to Rowe’s inference.”31 CORNEA stands for Condition Of ReasoNable Epistemic Access. In a nutshell, CORNEA indicates that:

On the basis of cognized situation s, human H is entitled to claim, “It appears that p” only if it is reasonable for H to believe that, given her cognitive faculties and the use she has made of them, if p were not the case, s would likely be different than it is in some way discernible by her.32

This concept is easier grasped expressed as follows:

H is entitled to infer “There is no x” from “So far as I can tell, there is no x” only if:

It is reasonable for H to believe that if there were an x, it is likely that she would perceive (or find, grasp, comprehend, conceive) it.33

Hence the “noseeum assumption,” as there is an inference that because something is not seen (“So far as I can tell, there is no x”), therefore it must not be (“There is no x”). But for this inference to hold, it must be reasonable for the person making the claim (“There is no x”) to perceive what is claimed not to be if it were to be. For example, it is reasonable for a person to claim, “My backyard contains no elephants” after observing his/her backyard; yet it would not be reasonable for that same person to claim, “My backyard contains no fleas” on the basis that no fleas were spotted because, as fleas are so small, there might be fleas in the backyard which cannot be seen.34

So, as Wykstra notes, Rowe is permitted to make his noseeum inference (that apparent senseless evil is not overweighted by good) only if he also makes likewise noseeum assumption that “If there are goods justifying God’s permission of horrendous evil, it is likely that we would discern or be cognizant of such goods.”35

Similarly, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Rowe’s first premise is that “There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.” From this premise, the following noseeum argument can be made: as God would only permit suffering if it served good, but because there are certain sufferings that we see no good, therefore in such sufferings there are no goods. However, a blind person’s lack of ability to see color (absence of evidence) would never be accepted as evidence for the non-existence of color. Perhaps we are too proud, thinking we are so smart; a humbling reality check might be required.

The American philosopher William James had a dog. James’ dog would often enter his office and observe the many thousands of books it contained, yet the dog did not understand what was being observed. It occurred to James that we are like his dog against a higher mind; that, like the dog, we are seeing things but merely understanding them superficially. Moreover, similar to James trying to explain that books contain ideas expressed in written language, with little success — only stares of utter incomprehension from his dog — we might also stare back with a similar level of incomprehension, due to the finite capacities of our minds, should this higher mind explain to us the depths of meaning of things.36

Thus, the accusations that God is ineffective against evil is untameable, for no being, human nor angelic (another than God Himself), can claim to know God’s mind; what He intends to accomplish, the way He intends to accomplish them, and how He will fulfil the demands of justice. To borrow the terms of CORNEA, we do not possess reasonable epistemic access. It is not an inherent cognitive faculty for humans to understand the divine. Indeed, Jesus told us: “If I have told you earthly things and you do not believe, how can you believe if I tell you heavenly things?” (Jn 3:12)

The above section offers responses to the evidential problem of evil. Ultimately we do not have the full picture. But this is cold comfort. We always seek to know why and understand; particularly when we are hurt. If we are incapable of seeing the full picture, is there a way to get a better perspective? Like observers of a pointillist artwork, that when viewed from up close is only a meaningless collection of colored dots, can we step back so the dots blend and pictures form?37 Yes, we can; and this is the theme of the following section.

Getting a better perspective

Perhaps the universe is like a pointillist artwork. Indeed, God pulls back Job so that he can have a better perspective of creation. In Job 10, the righteous Job, having lost everything good and dear he had, asks God why he is suffering such evils. God, out of a desert whirlwind, responds to Job’s request for an explanation: “Who is this that darkens counsel by words without knowledge? Gird up your loins like a man, I will question you, and you shall declare to me.” (Job 38:2-3) Then, God proceeds to zoom Job out, giving him a tour of the cosmos — not unlike a pointillist artist telling a confused observer to step back to make sense of the artwork. God asks Job:

Where were you when I laid the foundation of the earth? Tell me, if you have understanding. Who determined its measurements — surely you know! Or who stretched the line upon it? On what were its bases sunk, or who laid its cornerstone, when the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy? . . . Have you commanded the morning since your days began, and caused the dawn to know its place, that it might take hold of the skirts of the earth, and the wicked be shaken out of it? . . . Have you entered into the springs of the sea, or walked in the recesses of the deep? Have the gates of death been revealed to you, or have you seen the gates of deep darkness? Have you comprehended the expanse of the earth? Declare, if you know all this . . . Do you know the ordinances of the heavens? Can you establish their rule on the earth? (Job 38:4–7, 12–13, 16–18, 33)

In other words, suffering cannot be seen in isolation but must be seen within the context of God’s infinitely subtle work throughout the entirety of time and space. In a universe comprising innumerable events, individuals possessing free will, and unfathomable relations between everything, certain goods can only emerge alongside certain evils, and perhaps in such an incomprehensibly complex milieu, good and evil may become relative terms.38

Indeed, not all suffering is bad. As Rabbi Abraham Heschel is often quoted: “The man who has not suffered, what can he possibly know, anyway?”39 Certain virtues can only come about if evil co-exists, e.g. courage (doing what is good despite dangerous evils), compassion (suffering evils alongside another person), and love (placing someone else’s needs before one’s own — which would not be required if evil did not exist).40 So, although not all things are good, for the theist trusting God, all things work together for good.41

However, the reader of this article might object, “Was it not stated earlier that the argument that evil leads to greater good requires knowledge of God’s inner workings? something which this article argues is not possible. Has the article contradicted itself?” No, there is no contradiction, as ultimately the problem of evil has no answer but that of faith. Faith does not claim to understand everything, namely God. Indeed, the Catechism — quoting St. Augustine — states: “Even when he reveals himself, God remains a mystery beyond words: ‘If you understood him, it would not be God.’”42

Faith, hence, requires trust in God. As He did throughout history, God continues “educating his people to trust in him.”43 Recall, God did not give Job an answer as to why He permits evil, for — like us — Job is incapable of understanding them. Instead, by letting Job see His goodness face-to-face, shows how God’s goodness can permit evil.44

As we are unable to comprehend the reasons why, the how provides us with a better view, and in turn comfort in the face of evil. We are akin to children, not mature enough to understand why their mother permits lifesaving but painful medical procedures to be performed, yet the mother’s presence throughout the painful experience proofs her unfailing love and care. Undoubtedly, what assures the child are not reasons why — as such are cognitively inaccessible — but the mother’s closeness.45 Likewise, God’s intimate presence is our source of comfort. It is via this comfort of faith and trust in Him that we can achieve a better perspective on the problem of evil.

As the Catechism affirms:

Only Christian faith as a whole constitutes the answer to this question: the goodness of creation, the drama of sin and the patient love of God who comes to meet man by his covenants, the redemptive Incarnation of his Son, his gift of the Spirit, his gathering of the Church, the power of the sacraments and his call to a blessed life to which free creatures are invited to consent in advance, but from which, by a terrible mystery, they can also turn away in advance. There is not a single aspect of the Christian message that is not in part an answer to the question of evil.46

The Christian, hence, has an entire resource arsenal to crush the problem of evil.47 So, when faced this deepest of problems, it is only logical for the Christian to draw on such resources; namely, God’s presence, His intimacy and relationship with us, the experience of being face-to-face with God, for this is not just the highest good but an incommensurate good, utterly out-scaling any other relationship, good or, indeed, evil.48


In this article, the problem of evil was explored as framed around the accusation that God is ineffective. It has been demonstrated that this accusation is untenable for two key reasons: Firstly, in a response to the logical problem of evil, it has been established that the property of effectivity is only relevant for limited beings; however, God is unlimited, hence in no need of effectivity. Secondly, in a response to the evidential problem of evil, it has been seen that such an accusation requires an understanding of what the accused (i.e. God) is attempting to achieve, yet this is not possible for us humans to do as to comprehend the entirety of the divine is beyond our ability.

The problem of evil is not a contradiction but a paradox. Throughout the article, many illustrations have been employed; however, it must be acknowledged that none of them “solves” the problem of evil. To some extent, this article may be unsatisfying, and that is okay. Indeed, the problem of evil is not so much a problem of reasoning but of faith, and any unsatisfaction is an invitation to increase faith. If one seeks an adequate “resolution” to the problem of evil, it will only be in the fullness of the Christian faith.49

Moreover, it is only the Christian faith that can turn the accusation of God being ineffective on its head. The Christian can respond that God was not ineffective; on the contrary, at Calvary, He did the most effective thing against evil. Untimely, via Christ’s vicarious atonement, evil has been defeated, once and for all:

Moved by so much suffering, Christ not only allows himself to be touched by the sick, but he makes their miseries his own . . . On the cross Christ took upon himself the whole weight of evil and took away the “sin of the world” . . . By his passion and death on the cross Christ has given a new meaning to suffering: it can henceforth configure us to him and unite us with his redemptive Passion.50

Therefore, God and His love is the only true answer to the problem of evil.51

  1. Catechism of the Catholic Church, English translation. 2nd ed. (1997), title immediately above n. 309.
  2. Catechism of the Catholic Church, n. 309.
  3. David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779; repr., Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, 2006), 65.
  4. Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas, Second and Revised Edition, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (1920; Online Edition by Kevin Knight, 2008), Ia, q. 2, art. 3, arg. 1, http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1002.htm#article3.
  5. Cited in Trent Horn, Answering Atheism: How to Make the Case for God with Logic and Charity (San Diego: Catholic Answers Press, 2013), Kindle edition, chap. 6.
  6. Anselm of Canterbury, Proslogion, trans. M. Charlesworth, in Philosophy of Religion: A Guide and Anthology, ed. Brian Davies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), Chapter 2.
  7. Robert Barron, Catholicism: A Journey to the Heart of the Faith (New York: Image Books, 2011), 63.
  8. Thomas V. Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate (New York: Cornell University Press, 1986), 76.
  9. Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate, 93.
  10. Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate, 93–94.
  11. Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate, 108–109.
  12. Peter Kreeft, Fundamentals of the Faith (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988), 55.
  13. Thomas Aquinas, De Malo, trans. Richard Ingardia, in Readings in Medieval Philosophy, ed. Andrew B. Schoedinger (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), q. 1, art. 1, contra 1.
  14. Aquinas, De Malo, q. 1, art. 1, resolution.
  15. Aquinas, De Malo, q. 1, art. 1, resolution.
  16. Aquinas, De Malo, q. 1, art. 1, resolution.
  17. Aquinas, De Malo, q. 1, art. 1, resolution.
  18. Tim Staples, Nuts & Bolts: A Practical, How-To Guide For Explaining and Defending the Catholic Faith (Irving, TX: Basilica Press, 2007), 112.
  19. Staples, Nuts & Bolts, 110.
  20. Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate, 77.
  21. Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate, 78.
  22. Catechism of the Catholic Church, n. 205.
  23. Horn, Answering Atheism, chap. 7.
  24. Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate, 77.
  25. Kreeft, Fundamentals of the Faith, 57.
  26. William L. Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” American Philosophical Quarterly 16, no. 4 (October 1979): 337.
  27. Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” 337.
  28. Rowe, “Problem of Evil,” 337.
  29. Rowe, “Problem of Evil,” 337.
  30. Stephen J. Wykstra, “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of ‘Appearance,’” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16, no.2 (1984): 73.
  31. Nick Trakakis, “The Evidential Problem of Evil,” in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, www.iep.utm.edu/evil-evi/.
  32. Wykstra, “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering,” 85.
  33. Trakakis, “The Evidential Problem of Evil.”
  34. Horn, Answering Atheism, chap. 7.
  35. Trakakis, “The Evidential Problem of Evil.”
  36. Barron, Catholicism, 83.
  37. Barron, Catholicism, 82–83.
  38. Barron, Catholicism, 81–82.
  39. Kreeft, Fundamentals of the Faith, 57.
  40. Horn, Answering Atheism, chap. 7.
  41. Kreeft, Fundamentals of the Faith, 57.
  42. Catechism of the Catholic Church, n. 230.
  43. Catechism of the Catholic Church, n. 304.
  44. Marilyn McCord Adams, “Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God,” in Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions, ed. Eleonore Stump and Michael Murray (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 254–255.
  45. Adams, “Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God,” 254.
  46. Catechism of the Catholic Church, n. 309.
  47. Adams, “Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God,” 251.
  48. Adams, “Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God,” 256.
  49. Barron, Catholicism, 83.
  50. Catechism of the Catholic Church, n. 1505.
  51. Barron, Catholicism, 83. However, the pastoral aspect of the problem of evil ought to never be ignored also. For beneath the intellectual arguments, more often than not lie painful moral dilemmas, suffering, and perhaps anger, that cloaks reasoning. Thus the Christian has two duties towards atheists or anyone, including fellow Christians, doubting God’s love: (1) to use philosophy to penetrate their intellectual façade and, when their real personal problem is discovered, (2) to show them God’s infinite love and mercy.[52. Staples, Nuts & Bolts, 117.
Eric Manuel Torres About Eric Manuel Torres

Eric Manuel Torres is a Catholic moral theologian and bioethicist with a background in health care. Based in Melbourne, Australia, he is currently completing a doctorate (PhD) from Catholic Theological College/University of Divinity. He holds a Bachelor of Health Sciences and a Master of Orthoptics from La Trobe University, a Master of Nursing Science from the University of Melbourne, a Graduate Diploma of Theology and a Master of Theological Studies from Catholic Theological College/University of Divinity, and a Graduate Certificate of Specialist Inclusive Education from Deakin University. He also holds a Certificate III in Business Administration.